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DUE PROCESS FOR STUDENTS-NEW DEVELOPMENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Background and Context: Goss v. Lopez
The extent to which students in public schools and colleges are entitled to
procedural due process before they may be suspended or expelled has concerned lower federal courts since the 1961 "landmark"' decision of Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education.2 Recently, in Goss v. Lopez, 3 the Supreme Court addressed the issue for the first time. In Goss, nine Columbus,
Ohio public high school students were suspended from school for up to ten
days because of their alleged participation in disturbances at the school.
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statute permitting summary
suspension 4 on the ground that it was violative of fourteenth amendment
procedural due process. 5 In affirming the ruling of the three-judge district
court, 6 the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' statutory right to an
education 7 was an interest entitled to the protections of the fourteenth
amendment. 8 Specifically, the Court held that a student faced with suspen1. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 737 n.8 (1975); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22
Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 1032 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wright].
2. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
3. 95 S. CL 729 (1975).
4. The Ohio law provided in pertinent part: "The superintendent of schools of a city or
exempted village, the executive head of a local school district, or the principal of a public school
may suspend a pupil from school for not more than ten days. Such superintendent or executive
head may expel a pupil from school. Such superintendent, executive head, or principal shall
within twenty-four hours after the time of expulsion or suspension, notify the parent or guardian
of the child, and the clerk of the board of education in writing of such expulsion or suspension
including the reasons therefor. The pupil or the parent, or guardian, or custodian of a pupil so
expelled may appeal such action to the board of education at any meeting of the board and shall
be permitted to be heard against the expulsion." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.66 (Page 1972).
Thus, under the statute, although a student who had been expelled could appeal his expulsion,
the decision of a principal to suspend a student for up to ten days was final. In neither case was a
prior hearing required. For a comparable statute see Cal. Educ. Code §§ 10601-08 (West 1975).
5. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .
. ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), affd sub nom. Goss v. Lopez. 95
S. Ct. 729 (1975) (on direct appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970)).
7. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.48 (Page 1972) and id. § 3313.64 (Page Supp. 1973) guarantee
a free education to all Ohio residents between the ages of five and twenty-one.
8. The district court grounded its application of the fourteeth amendment on a finding of a
"liberty" interest in public education. 372 F. Supp. at 1299. The Supreme Court found both
"liberty" and "property" interests in the student's stake in his reputation and in the educational
benefits conferred by the school, respectively. 95 S. Ct. at 736. See generally Fuentes v Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 88-90 (1972) (due process clause does not merely protect against deprivation of
necessities); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (liberty interest in a person's
"good name, reputation, honor, or integrity").
The Supreme Court previously has characterized the importance of education to a student: "lIlt
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
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sion from public school for more than a "trivial period"9 must be given prior
oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence against
him and an opportunity to be heard in his defense. The Court qualified its
holding to provide for summary removal in the case of unruly students who
pose "a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of
disrupting the academic process . . . ."10 In such situations, the Court held
that the requisite notice and hearing should follow the removal as soon as
practicable. I
In Dixon, the Fifth Circuit had confronted the issue "whether the students
[expelled for participating in an off-campus civil rights demonstration] had a
right to any notice or hearing whatever before being expelled."'1 2 The court
held that the students had a right to "a statement of the specific charges" and
a hearing that provided "an opportunity to hear both sides in considerable
detail."1 3 Although Dixon dealt with the expulsion of college students, later
decisions have applied the requirements of notice and hearing to college
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these lays, It
is doubtful that any child'may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (racially
segregated schools deny equal protection of the laws). Lower courts have agreed. See, e.g., Dixon
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961)
("[E]ducation is vital and, indeed, basic to civilized society."); Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F.
Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Mass. 1971) ("[E]ducation is a basic personal right or liberty.'); Hosier v.
Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D.V.I. 1970) (public education is "so fundamental as to be fittingly
considered the corner stone of a vibrant and viable republican form of democracy . . .
Whether public education is a constitutional right or a right created by statute is irrelevant. As
the Court said in Goss v. Lopez, "[h]aving chosen to extend the right to an education to people of
appellees' class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right . . . absent fundamentally fair
procedures . . . ." 95 S. Ct. at 736; see Webster v. Perry, Civil No. 74-1161, at 6 (4th Cir., Mar.
17, 1975); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd,
415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); accord, Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (rejection of "the wooden distinction between 'rights' and
'privileges' ');Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 374 (1971). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968).
9. 95 S. Ct. at 737. It is unclear what was meant by "a trivial period," but it seems that a
suspension of even one day may require the procedural safeguards mandated by the Court. Id. at
742 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 740.
11. Id. This is in accord with cases holding that persons may be deprived of constitutionally
protected interests without prior notice and hearing in extraordinary situations. E.g., Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (summary seizure of misbranded food); Central
Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 566 (1921) (summary seizure of alien-owned securities
during wartime); cf. R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 911 (1962) (summary suspension of exemption from stock registration requirements).
12. 294 F.2d at 154.
13. Id. at 158-59. The court, however, emphasized that its ruling should not be read to
require a "full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses." Id. at 159. Also,
the court observed that "[t]he nature of the hearing should vary depending upon the circumstances of the particular case." Id. at 158.
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suspensions' and have extended these protections to public high school
students facing suspension or expulsion.' 5 The courts have disagreed, however, as to the duration of suspensions that require these procedural protections. 16
The extension of procedural due process to short suspensions is the most
innovative aspect of the Goss decision. In requiring notice and hearing, the
Court did not impose any new procedural safeguards.' 7 The Court went no
further than Dixon in the specific protections it required, 'sand was considerably more restrained than some lower federal courts have been.' 9 The Court
did not employ any new methods of analysis to determine what particular
procedures were required, applying the customary, flexible balancing test2 °
14. E.g., Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970) (college students suspended for two semesters); Stricklin v.Regents of
Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis. 1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir.
1970) (college students suspended for 13 days).
15. E.g., Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071. 1077-78 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973) (post-suspension hearing held sufficient for high school student
suspended indefinitely); Black Students of N. Fort Myers Jr.-Sr. H.S. v. Williams, 470 F.2d 957
(5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (students must be afforded hearing within a reasonable time after
suspensions for ten days or more); Pervis v. Lamarque Indep. School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054 (5th
Cir. 1972) (post-suspension hearing insufficient safeguard for high school students suspended for
balance of school year); Butler, The Public High School Student's Constitutional Right to a
Hearing, 5 Clearinghouse Rev. 431, 455-57 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir.
1973) (suspension for no more than "a few days" does not require a hearing); Linwood v. Board of
Educ., 463 F.2d 763, 768-69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972) (seven day suspension
is minor penalty not requiring due process safeguards); Dunn v. Tyler Indep. School Dist., 460
F.2d 137, 145-46 (5th Cir. 1972) (three day suspension does not require procedural protections);
Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 603 (D.N.H.), vacated mem., 502 F.2d 1159 (1st Cir.
1973) ("at least an informal administrative consultation" before any suspension; if suspension is
for more than five days, more formal hearing required).
17. The minimal requirements of prior notice and hearing long have been features of due
process in a variety of factual contexts. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67
(1974) (cancellation of prisoners' "good time" credtits); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S 67, 80-81
(1972) (prejudgment seizure of personalty); cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (substituted notice to parties interested in trust).
18. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
19. Courts have found a variety of additional procedural requirements in different situations.
The most extensive protections were required in Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209
(W.D.N.C. 1972), where the court required, in addition to notice and hearing, the right to
examine adverse evidence, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, to present evidence, to have a
record kept of the proceedings, to be represented by counsel, to have the decision based upon
substantial evidence, and to be judged by an impartial tribunal. Cf. DeJesus v Penberthy, 344
F. Supp. 70, 75-76 (D. Conn. 1972) (disapproval of hearsay testimony as grounds for expulsion;
presumption in favor of right of cross-examination). See also Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d
201, 211 (2d Cir. 1972) (military academy, right to present witnesses and evidence).
20. E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1974); Board of Regents v Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 570 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262-63 (1970); Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Hannah
v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
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to reach2 1an "appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved.
Because the Goss Court did not elaborate on the nature of the notice or
hearing it mandated, substantial questions remain as to what constitutes
adequate notice for short-term suspensions and precisely what form the
hearing should take in such cases. In addition, while the Court explicitly
refrained from extending to students the right to be represented by counsel, to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses or to call their own witnesses in
short-term suspension hearings, 22 it did warn that
[llonger suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures. Nor do we put aside the possibility that
suspension, something more
in unusual situations, although involving only a short
23
than the rudimentary procedures will be required.
Goss v. Lopez thus poses two problems for local school officials and lower
courts: how to develop procedures for short suspensions consistent with the
vague outlines of the opinion; and how to formulate standards for longer
suspensions, expulsions and "unusual situations."'24 For example, in the short
suspension situation, school officials must determine what forms of notice and
hearing would be acceptable under Goss; and for more serious disciplinary
proceedings, 25 they must decide whether due process requires that the student
be represented by counsel or have the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.
21. 95 S. Ct. at 739.
22. Id. at 740.
23. Id. at 741 (emphasis added).
24. The discussion of procedural protections in this Note is confined to situations in which a
student is faced with school discipline for a non-criminal offense. When a student's alleged
infraction of school rules also constitutes a crime (or, if the student is a juvenile, subjects him to
possible delinquency proceedings) the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination may
apply. See generally Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
47-55 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1967); Buss, Procedural Due Process
for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 545, 610 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Bussl.
25. Local school officials are faced with an additional problem arising from the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975), holding that public school
administrators could be held personally liable for depriving high school students of, among other
things, procedural safeguards prior to expulsion. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). Addressing the standard of liability, the Court stated: "The official must himself be acting
sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right, but an act violating a student's constitutional
rights can be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law on the part
of one entrusted with supervision of students' daily lives than by the presence of actual malice.
[A] school board member . . . must be held to a standard of conduct based not only on
permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of
[A] school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983
his charges ....
if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected . . . ." 95 S. Ct. at
1000-01. Wood appears to broaden the standards of liability from those set forth in Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) (upholding qualified immunity from § 1983 liability for
official acts done in good faith).
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Evaluating the Considerations

The Supreme Court in Goss cautioned that its ruling should not be read to
26
impose the formalities of courtroom procedure on disciplinary hearings.
Indeed, the Court indirectly referred to the procedures it required for short
suspensions as "rudimentary. '27 Consequently, in formulating procedures,
school administrators might follow Professor Wright's advice regarding university disciplinary hearings:
[T]he fourteenth amendment does not impose on universities any particular procedural
model, whether it be derived from criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings.
Instead the courts should accept any institutional procedure so long as it is reasonably
calculated to
be fair to the student involved and to lead to a reliable determination of
28
the issues.

In framing procedures for disciplinary hearings, local authorities must balance the student's "liberty" and "property" interests in remaining in school2 9
against the school's interests in financial and administrative economy,
maintenance of effective discipline and preservation of an academic atmosphere conducive to the educational process. 30 The respective interests of the
school and the student are not mutually exclusive. Thus, to the degree that an
unruly child profits from the lessons of discipline, his interests are not
inconsistent with the school's interest in effective discipline. 3 ' Finally, society
has a broad interest
in successful education and equitable treatment of its
32
younger members.

The extent of the procedural protections to be afforded in suspension or
expulsion hearings is determined in part by the extent to which a student
33
would be condemned to suffer grievous loss through the school's action.
This is implicit in the Goss Court's statement that longer suspensions than
those in the instant case might require additional safeguards. 34 Similarly, the
26. 95 S.CL at 740-41; cf. Lai v. Board of Trustees of E. Carolina Univ., 330 F Supp. 904,
905 (E.D.N.C. 1971) ("It is not necessary that (university disciplinary panelsl adopt all the
formalities of a court of law.").
27. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
28. Wright 1060 (emphasis added).
29. See Buss 575-77; Note, Procedural Due Process and Short Suspensions from the Public
Schools: Prologue to Goss v. Lopez, 50 Notre Dame Law. 364. 374-75 (1974); note 8 supra.
30. See Buss 573-74; Note, supra note 29, at 375-77.
31. As the Court observed in Goss v. Lopez, "[sluspension is considered not only to be a
necessary tool to maintain order but a valuable educational device." 95 S. Ct. at 739
32. "That [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source
and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (compulsory flag salute and
pledge of allegiance violates students' first and fourteenth amendment rights); cf. Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
33. Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (right to be heard before loyalty board). See also Fuentes v Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 86 (1972) (prejudgment seizure of personalty); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S 254, 262-63 (1970)
(termination of welfare payments).
34. See text accompanying note 23 supra. As Professor Buss has observld. "the appropriate
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Court's statement that school officials "may permit counsel" in "more difficult
cases" 35 implies that the complexity of the issues or the particular circumstances of the student involved may determine when additional
36
safeguards are constitutionally required.
Finally, the Court's language reveals a desire to minimize the adversarial
aspects of the disciplinary hearing: 37 because the interests of the student, the
school and society coincide in several ways, 38 the adversarial purposes of the
hearing are lessened. For this reason, school disciplinary hearings should
retain an essentially custodial orientation with the interests of the individual
student given strong consideration.
II.

THE SHORT-TERM SUSPENSION:

"RUDIMENTARY"

SAFEGUARDS

In Goss, the Court required, in general terms, that students receive oral or
written notice and an evidentiary hearing prior to suspensions for even brief
periods.3 9 Yet, the Court emphasized that in "the great majority of cases"
these requirements may be satisfied by an informal discussion between the
student and the disciplinarian, in which the student is told the basis of the
accusation and the evidence against him, and is allowed to present his version
of any disputed facts. 40 Such minimal procedures could be abused, however,
for the vague dictates of the opinion ostensibly could be satisfied simply by
summoning the student to the principal's office, reciting the charges and
suspending the student either without proper deliberation or against the
weight of the evidence. The Court's requirements that notice be "effective"
and that the hearing serve as "a meaningful hedge against erroneous action '4 1
provide the guidelines for preventing the single-step notice and hearing
procedure from being misused.
A. "Effective" Notice
"Effective" notice implies that the student be apprised of the charges in
enough detail to allow him to understand the nature of the accusation. Thus,
although "the notice of charges need not be drawn with the precision of a
criminal indictment, '42 it should be sufficiently detailed to enable the student
procedural requirements will vary with the relative severity of the applicable disciplinary
sanction." Buss 577. See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439, 1454 (1968); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540
(1971).
35. 95 S. Ct. at 741.

36. This approach is consistent with the Court's previous statement that "[tlhe opportunity to
be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard."
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970). See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
790-91 (1973).

37.
38.
39.

See 95 S. Ct. at 741.
See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
See text accompanying note 9 supra.

40.
41.

95 S. Ct. at 740.
Id. at 741.

42.

Jenkins v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992, 1000 (5th Cir. 1975); cf. Linwood
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to reply. 4 3 Further, such notice must be offered "sufficiently in advance of the
hearing to enable him to prepare a defense.""
Although Goss allows that "[t]here need be no delay between the time
'notice' is given and the time of the hearing, '4- it is clear that under some
circumstances the complexity of the charges, the type of evidence needed to
rebut accusations, and the possible appearance of counsel will necessitate that
the student have time to formulate his case. 4 6 Moreover, the intelligence, age,
sophistication and experience of the student should be considered by the
disciplining body in each case to insure that the timing and specificity of
notice is reasonably consistent with the needs of the particular student under
47
threat of sanction.

The Court's requirement of "written or oral notice" raises the question of
when written notice is necessary or when oral notice may suffice. In view of
the Court's apparent emphasis on a speedy determination,4 8 and within the
confines of the factors discussed above regarding the timing and specificity of
the notice, oral notice generally should be adequate for short suspensions. If a
student does not understand the charges against him, however, a written
notice that he could show to his parents or to counsel for interpretation would
be appropriate.

49

v. Board of Educ., 463 F.2d 763, 767 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972) (school
regulations need not be drawn as strictly as criminal statutes).
43. Jenkins v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992, 1000 (5th Cir. 1975); cf. Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
44. Buss 590. See also K. Davis, Administrative Law Text § 8.02 (3d ed. 1972). In the area of
notice, the imperatives of education do not necessarily coincide with the requirements of due
process. Due process may require a more detailed notice of charges than does the educational goal
of communicating to the child the reason for his punishment. Conversely, the educational
function of discipline might require a translation of the charge, if the student does not speak
English, so that he will understand fully the reason for his punishment. The question of whether
bilingual notice is required in school discipline cases was not decided in Goss; however, it has
been held not to be essential in hearings leading to termination of welfare benefits. Guerrero v.
Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.2d 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137
(1974); see Note, Bilingual Notice-The Rights of Non-English Speaking Welfare Recipients, 42
Fordham L. Rev. 626 (1974).
45. 95 S. CL at 740.
46. Buss 590; cf. Note, The Evolving Right of Due Process at Prison Disciplinary Hearings.
42 Fordham L. Rev. 878, 885 (1974).
47. See Buss 586-87; cf. text accompanying notes 95-98 infra.
48. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
49. Lower federal courts before Goss have not agreed as to whether notice should be oral or
written. Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 603 (D.N.H.), vacated mem., 502 F.2d 1159
(1st Cir. 1973) (suspension for more than five days requires written notice); Givens v. Poe, 346 F.
Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (written notice); General Order on Judicial Standards of
Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of
Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133, 147 (W. D. Mo. 1968) (en banc) (written notice); cf. Hagopian
v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 210 (2d Cir. 1972) (military student must be "apprised" of the
charges; quoting Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967)); Fielder v. Board of
Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722, 729 (D. Neb. 1972) (student must be given "adequate notice", Jones v.
State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 197 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aft'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir-
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B. "Meaningful" Hearing
In order that the hearing actually fulfill its function as a "meaningful hedge
against erroneous action,"5 0 the hearing officer must base his determination of
the facts on substantial evidence "affording a substantial basis of fact from
which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred." 5 1 Substantial evidence is
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."- 2 Although the Supreme Court has characterized
"substantial evidence" as "a term of art to describe the basis on which an
administrative record is to be judged by a reviewing court, '5 3 the requirement
that substantial evidence must support administrative action 54 reflects the
underlying judicial concern for affording fairness to the parties.5 5 Professor
Wright has asserted that the need for this standard, in the context of college
discipline, is "so obvious, and so fundamental, [as to] require little elaboration."'56 Lower federal courts, prior to Goss, commonly required that findings
of school
and college disciplinary bodies be based upon substantial evi7
dence. -

Goss imposes standards defined more by common sense than by technical
legal criteria upon school officials in formulating hearing procedures for
short-term suspensions. The opinion refuses to inject the type of formality and
adversarial structure found in the Court's procedural due process decisions in
other areas. 58 It appears to evidence an interest in avoiding undue disruption
1969), cert. dismissed, 397 U.S. 31 (1970) (per curiam) (student must be given "adequate and
timely" notice; quoting Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
The Goss Court did not discuss whether notice also must be given to the students' parents. It
seems that such additional notice is not required in short suspension cases, since the informal
hearing properly may follow soon after notice to the student. See text accompanying note 40
supra. Nevertheless, for longer suspensions or expulsions, notice to the parents is advisable
because of their strong interest in the welfare of the child and because the parent may act as an
effective intermediary between the student and the disciplinarian. Buss 587-89.
50. 95 S. Ct. at 741.
51. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299 (1939).
52. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); accord, Peoples Bank v.
Saxon, 373 F.2d 185, 189 (6th Cir. 1967).
53. United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963).
54. The Administrative Procedure Act, which governs procedures before federal administrative agencies, provides that "[a] sanction may not be imposed ...

except ... in accordance with

the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970).
55. C. McCormick, Evidence § 352 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
56. Wright 1072.
57. Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 603-04 (D.N.H.), vacated mem., 502 F.2d
1159 (1st Cir. 1973); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972); Jones v. State Bd.
of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
dismissed, 397 U.S. 31 (1970) (per curiam); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161, 171
(W.D. Mo. 1968), quoting General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in
Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133,
147 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (en banc).
58. E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation requires written
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of the relationship between school-as teacher and surrogate parent-and

student. In short, it would be error to read Goss as mandating the promulgation of standardized regulations governing student disciplinary proceedings.
Rather, the decision speaks directly to the disciplining official, requiring that
he evaluate the needs of the particular student brought before him and
calculate his actions so as to treat the student reasonably and in a fair
manner.
III.

LONG-TERM SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION CASES:
ANALOGY

AN

ARGUMENT

By

Although Goss specifically refused to accord students either the right to be
represented by counsel or the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses in
short-term suspension hearings, it did warn that safeguards other than
informal notice and hearing may be required in the case of long-term
suspensions and expulsions.5 9 The Court's mention of counsel and crossexamination may imply that these safeguards will constitute areas of particular concern in future cases dealing directly with the adequacy of procedures in
long-term discipline hearings. In order to determine the probable course of

judicial determinations, examination of the Supreme Court's recent treatment of these two protections 60 in a related context-the procedural rights of
prisoners, probationers and parolees-provides
useful analogies and profit61
able insights into the trend of the law.
notice, hearing, opportunity to testify and to present evidence and witnesses. crossexamination--subject to discretion of hearing officer-impartial hearing body, written statement
of factfinding); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970) (welfare termination requires
notice, hearing, cross-examination, opportunity to testify orally, allowance of retained counsel, a
decision based on the evidence, statement of factfinding, impartial hearing body); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 31-59 (1967) (adjudication of juvenile delinquency requires particularized notice,
hearing, right to retained or appointed counsel, cross-examination, privilege against selfincrimination, appellate review, transcript of proceedings).
59. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
60. Although the remainder of this Note deals separately with the protections of counsel and
cross-examination, they are interrelated. Thus. in certain situations, see text accompanying notes
96-98 infra, cross-examination should be conducted by counsel to be effective.
61. Other useful analogies may be found in cases expanding the substantive right's of students
and in the procedural protections afforded in welfare termination, civil commitment and juvenile
delinquency proceedings. For student rights cases see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (student right of symbolic speech); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (students may not be compelled to salute flag or pledge
allegiance); Stevenson v. Board of Educ.. 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957
(1970) (grooming code is constitutional if reasonably related to school administration), noted in 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1702 (1971); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 400
U.S. 826 (1970) (school may not prohibit publication of student "underground" newspaper absent
reasonable showing of substantial disruption); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969). cert
denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970) (school's prohibition of long hair is unconstitutional absent showing
of actual disruption); Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W. D. Pa. 1972) (corporal punishment
forbidden if prohibited by parents); Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D Tex.), aff'd per
curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972) (corporal punishment
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62

In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Supreme Court held that a state may not
revoke an individual's parole without a hearing leading to "a final evaluation
of any contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as
determined warrant revocation." 63 To effectuate this standard, the Court
required that the parolee be given, among other protections, an opportunity
to cross-examine adverse witnesses "unless the hearing officer specifically
finds good cause for not allowing confrontation. ' 64 The Court did not reach
the question whether the hearing body must allow counsel to be present.
As in Goss, the Morrissey Court employed a balancing test 65 to accommodate the relevant interests of the parolee, the correctional authorities and
society. It identified the parolee's interest as being able to live with his family
and to seek employment, 66 and the authorities' interest as the avoidance of
"the burden of a new adversary criminal trial."'67 In addition, the Court noted
that society has an interest in effective rehabilitation, which is enhanced by
"treating the parolee with basic fairness" and thereby avoiding "reactions to
arbitrariness. ' 68 These interests parallel those of students, schools and society
in the student discipline context: 69 parolees and students have common
"liberty" interests in their reputations; 70 parole boards and schools share
interests in administrative economy; 7' and society has closely corresponding
interests in the effective education of students and successful rehabilitation of
parolees. 72 It is arguable, however, that the analogy is not perfect, since a
parolee faced with return to prison may be confronted with a more "grievous
implementing competent state policy is permitted). See generally Gyory, The Constitutional
Rights of Public School Students, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 201 (1971).
The leading case dealing with procedural due process at welfare termination hearings is
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See also Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.Zd
833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974). For a thorough discussion of
procedural due process in the context of civil commitment see Note, Due Process and the
Development of "Criminal" Safeguards in Civil Commitment Adjudications, 42 Fordham L.
Rev. 611 (1974).

Recent Supreme Court cases increasing procedural protections in juvenile proceedings include
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1971).
62. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).

63. Id. at 488.
64. Id. at 489. One court has suggested that "good cause" is limited to danger to informants.
McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 323 (4th Cir. 1973).

65. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
66. 408 U.S. at 482; cf. note 8 supra.
67. 408 U.S. at 483.
68. Id. at 484; cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)
(quoted in note 32 supra); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
69. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
70. See note 8 supra.
71. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
72. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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loss" than a student facing suspension or expulsion. 73 Similarly, the state's
interest in summary adjudication may be greater in the parole revocation
context, where the possibility exists
of a dangerous parole violator remaining
74
at large during the proceedings.
A year after Morrissey, the Court ruled in Gagnon v. Scarpelli7" that in
certain circumstances indigent probationers are entitled to be represented by
appointed counsel at hearings prior to revocation of probation. 7 6 Drawving
heavily on Morrissey, the Gagnon Court found the relevant interests to be the
same in the context of probation as in parole;7 7 it is clear that the Gagnon
ruling extends to parolees as well. 78 Under Gagnon, the determination of
when probationers or parolees are entitled to counsel must be made on a
case-by-case basis7 9 because the "need for counsel . . . derives, not from the

invariable attributes of those hearings, but rather from the peculiarities of
particular cases." 80 The Court ruled that counsel is required if fundamental
fairness depends "on the use of skills which the probationer or parolee is
unlikely to possess." 8' Thus, while avoiding precise guidelines, the Court held
that counsel should be present if a parolee or probationer denies having
committed the offense or if the case presents complicated mitigating factors.
The Court further suggested that the agency responsible for revocation should
consider the capability of the probationer to speak effectively for himself.82
83
Finally, and most recently, the Supreme Court, in W'olff v. McDonnell,
73. But see note 8 supra; Fielder v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722. 729 (D. Neb. 1972);
Buss 575-77; Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1406, 1407 (1957).
74. Under Morrissey, this danger is greatly reduced since a suspected parole violator may be
returned to prison on a finding of probable cause preceding the hearing. 408 U.S. at 485-87; see
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 95, 103 (1972).
75. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
76. Id. at 791. In Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 133-37 (1967), the Court previously had
held that a probationer is entitled to appointed counsel at a combined revocation and sentencing
hearing.
77. 411 U.S. at 782-85.
78. The Court held that "revocation of probation where sentence has been imposed previously is constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole." Id. at 782 n.3
79. Id. at 787-91; cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (case-by-case approach to right to
counsel in felony prosecutions; overruled in favor of per se rule in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963)).
80. 411 U.S. at 789.
81. Id. at 786. "[T]he unskilled or uneducated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty
in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the presentation requires the examining
or cross-examining of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex documentary evidence."
Id. at 787; cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970).
82. 411 U.S. at 790-91. For subsequent lower court applications of Gagnon v Scarpelli see
Preston v. Piggman, 496 F.2d 270, 275 (6th Cir. 1974) (presence of counsel required where
mitigating facts exist and counsel would help present them in an orderly fashion; counsel may call
witnesses and cross-examine adverse witnesses); Lane v. Attorney Gen., 492 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.
1974) (per curiam); Forbes v. Roebuck, 368 F. Supp. 817. 820 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (admission of
breach of parole may render counsel unnecessary).
83.

418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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addressed the question of what procedural protections are required before
prison authorities may revoke or withhold an inmate's "good time '8 4 credits.
Balancing the prisoner's liberty interest 5 against the prison's need to maintain order in a "closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who
have chosen to violate the criminal law,"'8 6 the Court refused to extend the
full range of protections afforded parolees and probationers under Morrissey
and Gagnon.87 Thus, although the Court required written notice, an opportunity to present evidence and to call witnesses, and a written statement of
the findings of fact and evidence relied on by the disciplinary authority, 88 it
ruled that due process does not afford to inmates the right to be represented
by counsel or to cross-examine adverse witnesses. 8 9
In Wolff, the Court denied the protection of counsel because "[t]he insertion
of counsel into the disciplinary process would inevitably give the proceedings
a more adversary cast and tend to reduce their utility as a means to further
correctional goals." 90 The Court based its denial to the prisoner of the
opportunity to cross-examine his accusers on the "considerable potential for
havoc inside the prison walls," 9 1 noting that to reveal the identities of
92
unknown inmate accusers might lead to reprisals.
The similarity of the interests found in the parole-probation and student
discipline situations 93 justifies the use of the Morrissey and Gagnon reasoning
to extend representation by counsel to students facing long-term suspensions
or expulsions. As will be developed below, however, the analogy of interests
between the school and prison situations is weaker. 94 Morrissey and Gagnon
provide support for allowing counsel to students facing more severe discipline
than the ten-day suspension involved in Goss. Thus, if a student denies
having committed the offense or if the issues are complex, it is likely that
courts will require counsel in future suspension or expulsion cases. 9 The
84. A revocation or withholding of "good time" credits results in the extension of a prisoner's
term of confinement. Id. at 547.
85. Id. at 557. See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 418 (1974) (prisoner's interest in
uncensored mail is fourteenth amendment liberty interest).
86. 418 U.S. at 561.
87. Id. at 571-72; see text accompanying notes 62-64, & 75-76 supra.
88. 418 U.S. at 563-66.
89. Id. at 567-70.
90. Id. at 570; cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973). The Wolff Court
provided, however, that when an inmate is illiterate or the issues are complex, the assistance of a
member of the prison staff or a fellow inmate should be permitted. 418 U.S. at 570.
91. 418 U.S. at 567.
92. Id. at 568-69.
93. See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.
94. See text accompanying notes 111-20 infra.
95. Lower federal courts before Goss v. Lopez have divided on the question of representation
by counsel. Compare Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972), French v. Bashful,
303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (E.D. La. 1969), appeal dismissed, 425 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1970), and
Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 752 (W.D. La. 1968) (cases allowing
counsel), with Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 211 (2d Cir. 1972), Wasson v. Trowbridge,
382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967), and General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and

19751

STUDENT DUE PROCESS

1023

suggestion in Gagnon that the determination of whether to permit counsel
should include consideration of the probationer's ability to speak for himself is
particularly relevant to school discipline. Some students, especially younger
ones, may not be capable of representing themselves adequately, 9 6 or may
become emotional when confronted with the prospect of suspension or
expulsion. 9 7 In such cases, the presence of counsel would aid in the accurate
finding of disputed facts and further the common interests of the student, the
school and society98 in an equitable resolution of the controversy.
Whether Morrissey and Gagnon necessarily point to a right of crossexamination in long-term student suspension or expulsion cases is less clear
than the question of representation by counsel. 99 The Supreme Court has
recognized that cross-examination is "a fundamental aspect of procedural due
process." 100 Nevertheless, in Morrissey the Court explicitly qualified the right
of cross-examination in parole revocation hearings, subjecting it to the
discretion of the hearing officer.' 0 1 The Court's reason for so limiting crossexamination was the possibility of harm to the adverse witness if his identity
were revealed to the parolee.' 0 2 Although one may assume that, in general,
students are less prone to serious violence than convicted criminals, the
possibility of reprisals against accusing witnesses at suspension or expulsion
hearings cannot be overlooked. The undesirability of escalating the adversary
nature of the proceedings' 0 3 is another factor militating against requiring
cross-examination in school hearings. Further, in determining whether crossexamination is required, local authorities might consider the possibility that
confrontation with the accused student would deter witnesses to misconduct
from coming forward because of possible harm or peer pressure. 14 Balanced
Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45
F.R.D. 133, 147-48 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (en banc) (citing cases denying representation). See
generally Buss 605-612; Butler, The Public High School Student's Constitutional Right to a
Hearing, 5 Clearinghouse Rev. 431, 462-63 (1971).
96. Cf. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967) (counsel not required when

college student is, inter alia, educated, mature and can present his own defensel.
97.

See, e.g., Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 95, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899, 901 (Sup. Ct- 1907)

(high school student, allegedly caught cheating, " 'highly excited, emotional state and in tears' '1
98. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
99. As with the right to counsel, see note 95 supra, lower courts before Goss have disagreed
on the question of a student's right to cross-examine witnesses. Compare Givens v. Poe, 346 F.
Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (cross-examination allowed), and Keene v. Rodgers, 316 F
Supp. 217, 221 (D. Me. 1970) (same), with Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778. 788 (2d Cir.

1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968) (cross-examination not allowed), and Davis v. Ann
Arbor Pub. Schools, 313 F. Supp. 1217,

1227 (E.D. Mich. 1970) (same).

100. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 428 (1969); see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
269 (1970); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1963).
101. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
102. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972); cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
568-69 (1974).

103.

This concern was expressed by the Court in Goss. 95 S. Ct. at 741

104.

Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-62 (1974).
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against these considerations is the student's interest in not being suspended or
expelled because of mistaken or fabricated testimony. 10 5
In reconciling these interests, school officials should follow a case-by-case
approach similar to that applied by the Court to the right to counsel in
Gagnon.106 Thus, as Professor Wright suggests, "if the case resolves itself into
a problem of credibility, and the tribunal must choose to believe either the
accused or his accuser, cross-examination is the condition of enlightened
action and is therefore required in the interests of fairness and reasonableness."' 0 7 If circumstances such as physical danger to the witness are present,
however, school officials might follow the approach prescribed by one district
court in DeJesus v. Penberthy, 108 in which the court held that crossexamination should be required in expulsion situations except in "extreme"
cases. 0 9 In such situations, the disciplinary body may take the adverse
testimony, but it must excercise the responsibility to question the witness and
furnish the accused student with a summary of the testimony." 1 Presumably,
the student then could suggest to the hearing body questions which would test
the accuracy of the testimony.
An examination of the reasons why the Court in Wolff denied counsel and
cross-examination to prisoners facing discipline reveals that Wolff is less
analogous to student discipline than are Morrissey and Gagnon. Wolff did not
require counsel' because the Court found that the presence of counsel would
make the disciplinary hearing inordinately adversarial, thus inhibiting the
correctional process. 112 This consideration parallels the Goss Court's concern3
about increasing the adversary character of student disciplinary hearings,' 1
and reflects, to some degree, the common interests of the inmate, the prison
and society in effective rehabilitation. It is significant, however, that the Wolff
Court held that revoking or withholding "good time" credit did not constitute
as severe a deprivation of liberty as the revocation of parole because it did
not immediately change the prisoner's status. Since it was "not the same
immediate disaster that the revocation of parole is for the parolee,"' 14 the
Court declined to extend the full range of protections provided by Morrissey
and Gagnon.1M The Court also pointed out that "good time" credits may be
105. Cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
106. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
107. Wright 1076.
108. 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972).

109. In order for cross-examination to be dispensed with, the court held that the testifying
witness must be "inhibited to a significantly greater degree than would result simply from the
inevitable fact that his accusations will be made known to the accused student." Id. at 76.
110. Id.
111.

The Court excluded both the right of retained and appointed counsel in Wolff. 418 U.S.

at 570.
112. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
113.
114.
115.

95 S. Ct. at 741.
418 U.S. at 561.
Id. at 560-61.
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restored.16 Applying this reasoning to long-term student suspensions or
expulsions, the disciplining of a student by his removal from school is an

"immediate disaster;"' 7 it works an instant change in his status and, although he is removed from school while a parolee is returned to prison, the
adverse consequences of both actions are, in large part, equally irreversible.
The denial of cross-examination in Wolff was grounded in the necessity of
maintaining order in the prison and in protecting the physical welfare of
witnesses." 8 The prison's interest in preventing "havoc" inside its walls was
deemed to outweigh the prisoner's interest in confrontation of adverse witnesses. In this regard, schools are readily distinguishable from prisons; for,
while they have an interest in maintaining discipline and even may be
characterized as "closed, tightly controlled environment[s]," they are not
"peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law."' 9 While
there may be violent students likely to harm those who testify against .them,
this problem is obviated by a case-by-case approach consistent with Morrissey
and Gagnon and suggested in DeJesus v. Penberthy.12o
IV. CONCLUSION
Goss v. Lopez is an attempt to quiet one of the "[m]any controversies
[which] have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process
Clause ....
,,12' by a balancing of the interests involved in school suspensions. Because the opinion is limited to short suspensions, and because of the
Court's dictum that longer suspensions or expulsions may require more formal
procedures, further litigation is unavoidable. For the present, however,
school officials should be guided in their conduct of disciplinary proceedings
by the spirit of Goss as much as by its specific holding. It is a spirit of fair
dealing and reasonableness between student and disciplinarian requiring,
above all, an exercise of sound judgment by school administrators of the
appropriateness of particular procedures, considering the needs of the individual student and the institutional requirements of the school. The Supreme
Court has said in a similar context that it will not set aside decisions of school
administrators simply because they lack "wisdom or compassion.'1 2
Nevertheless, to the extent that fundamental fairness depends upon a com23
passionate treatment of students by those charged with their education,1
due process requires a compassionate and reasoned application of procedures
to school hearings.
Robert Stolz
116.

Id. at 561.

117. The emphasis here is on the "immediacy" of the event, not necessarily its "disastrous"
quality.
118. See text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
119. 418 U.S. at 561; see text accompanying note 86 supra.
120.

See text accompanying notes 64, 79, 106 & 108-110 supra.

121. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306. 313 (1950)122. Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1003 (1975); see note 25 supra.
123. Professor Seavey has observed that "a university and its instructors are subject to
fiduciary duties in dealing with their students .... ." Seavey. Dismissal of Students. "Due
Process," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1406, 1409 (1957).

